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Ethnic, linguistic or religious differences may lead 
to conﬂict when individuals and groups compete 
over power, material and symbolic resources. 
However, language (or any component of culture) 
itself does not cause conﬂict. Rather it constitutes 
a “fault line” along which conﬂicts can crystallise 
when linguistic or cultural differences translate 
into incompatible political claims or unequal ac-
cess to socio-economic opportunity within states. 
This entry focuses on the causal factors leading 
to the development of conﬂicts along ethno-lin-
guistic lines. 
What does research tell us? 
The rules and practices governing language in 
administration, law, education, media, public sig-
nage and communication with the authorities and 
public service providers affect the interests and 
identities of people. Language is, therefore, una-
voidably politicised in multilingual societies. 
Conﬂicts between language majorities and mi-
norities are nurtured by the logic of the territorial 
nation-state and the power asymmetries encoded 
in it. Modern nation-states, particularly since the 
19th century, have almost systematically privi-
leged ethnic majorities (“titular” nations). Major-
ity and minority perspectives often conﬂict over 
the interpretation of realities and/or the desired 
model of state-minority relations.
The dynamics of conﬂict vary due to differences 
in historically formed administrative structures, 
power constellations and the relational position 
of minorities and majorities at different levels. 
The self-perception of many European societies 
as monolingual nation-states continues to shape 
policy choices, and even ofﬁcial multilingualism 
does not necessarily eliminate conﬂicts between 
linguistic communities. 
The macro environment is not always helpful: in-
ternational minority rights norms are often con-
tested and subordinated to geopolitical interests; 
without a robust and common European minor-
ity rights regime, EU member states remain un-
accountable for the non-implementation of mi-
nority protection commitments; and the primacy 
of domestic party politics often overpowers the 
inﬂuence of EU conditionality. 
Illustration and evidence 
Conflict patterns vary both among and within 
states. Field research in The Serbian region of 
Vojvodina shows that some places display har-
monious co-habitation of ethnic and linguistic 
communities, and multilingualism in practice is 
reﬂected by almost unnoticeable shifts from one 
language into another (e.g. in Belo Blato/Nagyer-
zsébetlak/Biele Blato). Conversely, conflict has 
ﬂared up in other areas, following the inﬂux of a 
large number of Serb refugees from Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina after the wars of the early 
1990s. Manifestations of conﬂict included an in-
crease in ethnically motivated incidents (grafﬁti, 
damage to private property, to religious and me-
morial objects, as well as verbal and physical at-
tacks) against minorities. Generalising from these 
ﬁndings, and taking account of tensions observed 
in other contexts, we may identify several con-
ﬂict-inducing processes. They are summarised in 
the table in the opposite page.
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Policy implications 
The historical multiethnic and multilingual 
make-up of European states should be adequate-
ly reﬂected in legislation. Ethno-cultural fairness 
and loyalty towards the common state requires 
a combination of group-neutral and group-sen-
sitive regulation and policies, the inclusion of 
national minorities’ identity in the common con-
cepts (e.g. inclusion of their language in public in-
stitutions), and institutional guarantees for their 
cultural reproduction. Non-secessionist minority 
claim-making should be regarded as a legitimate 
part of contestation about the terms of political 
inclusion in a multiethnic democracy. 
Ethnic and linguistic pluralism should be reﬂected 
in policy solutions that exploit different tiers of 
government (national, regional and local), ﬁne-
tune the allocation of competencies between 
these authorities, and build in asymmetries in 
favour of languages most in need of protection. 
Policy solutions related to multilingualism should 
also reflect a complementary (“additive”) ap-
proach, instead of an exclusionary (“subtractive”) 
approach, enabling the learning of the state’s of-
ﬁcial language as a second language essential to 
employment and social mobility, while reinforc-
ing the mother tongue as a ﬁrst language essential 
to identity, psychological and security needs. 
CONFLICT-INDUCING PROCESSES IN CASES OF ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC “FAULT LINES”
1.
Unwarranted securitization of ethnic and language issues: interpretation, by majority elites, of culturally framed minority 
claims as threats to state integrity; mistrust of separate minority institutions as sites of counter-state nationalism;  
from a minority perspective, the notion of a shared identity designed by the nationalising state and the imposition of 
ethno-cultural neutrality and group-neutral regulation become suspect as codes for assimilation. E.g. among many  
other examples, Estonia, France, Greece, Romania, Slovakia 
2. Violation of, restriction of the use of, or reduction of the scope of vested minority (language) rights: undisguised downgrading of the status of the language of the minority in administration, education, etc. E.g. Ukraine 
3.
Ethnic gerrymandering: redrawing of administrative or electoral district borders in ways that divide territorially 
concentrated minority population, reverse minority-majority status, and/or minimize minority communities’ voting power 
and/or chances to enjoy minority rights. E.g. Slovakia (administrative reorganisation, 1996) 
4.
Contested markers of identity between majority and minority peoples coexisting on shared territory: competing efforts to 
associate a territory with one language and imposing an artificial territorial continuity in the marking of physical 
space and the operations of public institutions (possibly with an overemphasis on language as a marker of national identity 
over language as a means of communication). E.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia 
5.
Unilateral kin-state activism and extra-territorial nation-building practices: efforts to reinforce the links with the kin state in 
a way that downplays minorities’ sense of belonging to their country of residence. E.g. Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Serbia 
(vis-à-vis neighbouring states) 
6. Competing nation-building efforts exposing claimed co-ethnics/co-nationals or “in-between” minorities to irreconcilable loyalty pressures. E.g. Bunjevci, Çams, Csángós, Goranci, Pomaks, Torbeši, Vlachs (South-Eastern Europe)
